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Law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide struggle to find effective ways to fight and
control organized crime. However, illegal networks operate outside the law and much of the data
collected is classified. Therefore, little is known about criminal networks structure, topological
weaknesses, and control. In this contribution we present a unique criminal network of federal crimes
in Brazil. We study its structure, its response to different attack strategies, and its controllability.
Surprisingly, the network composed of multiple crimes of federal jurisdiction has a giant component,
enclosing more than a half of all its edges. This component shows some typical social network
characteristics, such as small-worldness and high clustering coefficient; however it is much “darker”
than common social networks, having low levels of edge density and network efficiency. On the other
side, it has a very high modularity value, Q = 0.96. Comparing multiple attack strategies, we show
that it is possible to disrupt the giant component of the network by removing only 2% of its edges
or nodes, according to a module-based prescription, precisely due to its high modularity. Finally,
we show that the component is controllable, in the sense of the exact network control theory, by
getting access to 20% of the driver nodes.
PACS numbers: 64.60.aq, 89.75.Fb
INTRODUCTION
Despite recent efforts of Brazilian law enforcement
agencies in combating organized crime, the horizon looks
no promising: homicide rates have spiked in 2014 reach-
ing 29.1 deaths per hundred thousand people [1], the
country has become the second greatest consumer of co-
caine in the world —turning into one of the most impor-
tant corridors for international drug trafficking—, cor-
ruption and money laundry have pervaded major enter-
prises and important political figures nationwide [2].
The problem is multivariable, from cultural and histor-
ical issues to the structure of the judicial and law enforce-
ment systems. However, from the network science point
of view, another important reason lies on the structure
of the web of crime and on the characteristics of tradi-
tional police interventions. Law enforcement actions con-
sist mainly in random arrests and operations focusing on
big criminal leaders, in a strategy loosely resembling a
degree-based attack. Nonetheless, it was shown that the
social structure of criminal activities is, in fact, highly
resilient to the traditional law enforcement approach [3–
5]. In this sense, as pointed out in earlier studies, there is
a lack of directions or focused strategy in crime fighting
which, most of the times, is reactive, always standing one
step behind criminal undertakings [6–9]. Thence, the ne-
cessity to address law enforcement in a proactive frame-
work and crime as a collective complex system brings us
to the study of this criminal network.
The sociological literature vastly supports both the-
oretically and experimentally the adoption of network
methods in studying criminal rings [10–13]. For instance,
the social facilitation model [14, 15] states that the im-
pulse of an individual to criminal actions is somehow
strengthened by his or hers membership to a criminal
organization. Therefore, atomizing the network struc-
ture of a criminal organization would lower, theoretically,
the crime rates. In this sense, many studies in social
science have focused in efficient ways to dismantle this
dreadful phenomenon. However, these contributions are
mostly based on qualitative and loose aspects of individ-
uals rather than on their quantitative and collective role
in maintaining the network functioning as a whole (i.e.
their topological centralities) [16, 17]. Several researchers
have recently illustrated the benefits of applying network
science and statistical physics [18] to study the structure
and fragility of the criminal phenomenon. For instance,
Agreste et al. have recently studied the network structure
and resilience of the Sicilian Mafia (often known as Cosa
Nostra) [19]. In that paper, the cooperation with Ital-
ian law enforcement agencies yield to a bipartite network
(contact and criminal), which showed different robust-
ness to network attacks —the contact network is much
more fragile to targeted attacks than the criminal one.
Despite that, the authors did not study the Mafia net-
work’s modularity and its robustness to Module-Based
Attacks(MBA) [20] or other more efficient methods of
attack [21]. Besides, other authors have studied Mafia
syndicates, pointing to the strong hierarchical networked
organization with a few cappos (bosses) commanding the
criminal activities [22].
Due to the economic-driven nature of organized crime,
a common feature of criminal systems is the balance be-
tween the secrecy of its illegal activities and the efficiency
of its communications and operations. As shown in ear-
lier researches, these traits are directly related to the net-
work structure of the criminal phenomenon [23]. There-
fore, such systems need stable action-based relationships
2FIG. 1. Representation of the largest connected component
of the federal crimes network consisting of 9,887 individuals
and 91 modules. Colors represent nodes from the same com-
munities as extracted by the Louvain method.
which increases network efficiency and consequently re-
sults in higher risks for the illegal enterprise. Precisely
because of that, criminal networks tend to be fragile to
targeted attacks [24]. However, Duijn el al. [25] pointed
out recently, when studying a drug related network from
the Dutch Police, that criminal organizations may be-
come more efficient as a response to targeted attacks.
The positive counterpart is the decrease of the network’s
security, offering strategic opportunities for law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies to plan effective network
disruption operations.
In order to address precisely this phenomenon, as part
of an ongoing collaboration with Brazilian Federal Po-
lice, we had access to data collected from several federal
crimes which result in a web of almost 24,000 individu-
als across several layers of criminal relationships. This
unique set of data allows us to study the social networks
adjacent to the criminal phenomenon and its topological
weaknesses. Therefore, it is of high practical importance
to search for the most efficient way to shatter these social
networks in order to help reducing criminal levels
Consequently, in this contribution we aim at describing
the structure of such network, finding effective methods
to disrupt it, and to control the activities on such a sys-
tem.
The paper is organized as follows: we first present the
collected data, next we describe the underlying topology
of the resulting network; then, we study the network’s
fragility to targeted attacks; after that, we explore the
controllability of the network. At the end, the main re-
sults are summarized and conclusions are drawn.
DATASET AND METHOD
The dataset was obtained by the office of the Brazil-
ian Federal Police at Rio Grande do Sul and anonymized
before releasing for scientific, academic, and collabora-
tive purposes. The record of criminal investigations were
gathered from April 2013 to August 2013 and consist of
information provided directly by each case’s investigator
who would inform, through a computer application (i.e.
a digitized version of card files), the proper relationship
among the individuals investigated by he or she resulting
in N = 23, 666 individuals (nodes) and E = 35, 913 rela-
tionships (edges). The query consisted of investigations
concerning all federal crimes, a set of very different crimes
such as organized crime, money laundering, international
drug trafficking, terrorism, international pedophilia rings
and corruption schemes. The original police database of
criminal records contains classified information. On ac-
count of that, data was filtered and anonymized in or-
der to protect individual rights and comply with legal
requirements. Topological features of the relationships
were preserved in order to study the adjacent network
structure. The anonymized network data is available at
Konect (http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/).
The resulting undirected and unweighted network has
3, 425 unconnected components with a medium size of
only 7 individuals. However, the degree dispersion
〈k2〉/〈k〉 = 7.42 is much higher than the Molloy-Reed
criterion meaning the network is actually in a regime
which there is a giant component pervading the whole
system [26]. This is the first important result of our
study, for it was not expected that a giant component
would rise in a set of actors committing criminal actions
not related in principle to one another– such as drug
trafficking and pedophilia. Therefore, from now on we
focus only on the giant component of the system, since
the fragmented pieces might be considered as a residual
criminal phenomenon characteristic of every society while
the largest connected component represents a generalized
and self-organized criminal phase that is more dangerous
from a national security point of view that should be con-
cerned carefully by federal and national law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. The largest connected compo-
nent consists of 9, 887 nodes and 19, 744 edges (40% of
the total number of nodes and 54% of the total number
of edges, see Fig. 1)
3N E δ η
Facebook (NIPS) 2888 2981 0.0071 29.3%
Hamsterster 2426 16631 0.0056 20.8%
Crime 829 1473 0.0043 21.5%
PF (Fig. 1) 9887 19744 0.0004 8.4%
TABLE I. Comparative data between the federal crimes net-
work and other social networks: Number of nodes (N), num-
ber of edges (E), edge density (δ), and graph efficiency (η) for
four distinct social networks: a Facebook user-user friendship
network [27, 28], a friendship network for the user of the web-
site hamsterster.com [29], a criminal dataset recorded by St
Louis Police in the 1990s [30], and the federal crimes network
of this contribution.
NETWORK STRUCTURE
The density and the efficiency of a criminal network is
usually related to the “brightness” of the system in the
sense that a large number of connections among crimi-
nals means that if one actor is caught by law enforcement
or intelligence agencies it would be possible, at first, to
extract critical information about the network’s struc-
ture [25]. On the other hand, a darker network means
the direct transfer of information within the system is
slowed down due to the decreased number of possible
path among criminals. Therefore, both the network den-
sity and the network efficiency informs us about the com-
promise between security and effective diffusion of infor-
mation and data. This is precisely the case of our network
which is “darker” than some traditional social networks,
i.e. it has lower edge density levels, and at the same time
it has a very low graph efficiency (see Table I). The radar
chart presented in Fig. 2 shows the topological differ-
ences between the criminal network and its randomized
version, where all edges are rewired. The data highlight
the small-worldness [26] of the system since the network
has small average shortest path length as compared to
the network’s diameter but with a larger clustering coef-
ficient.
The degree distribution of a graph is of utmost impor-
tance in unraveling the nature of its adjacent system. For
instance, besides other practical implications, networks
with homogeneous degree distributions, which the prob-
ability p(k) that an arbitrary node has degree k decays
exponentially for large values of k, face a transition from
a fully connected to a disconnected phase if a fraction qc
is randomly removed from it [31]. On the other hand,
graphs in which p(k) has a heterogeneous distribution
are usually robust to random failure of nodes but weak
to targeted attacks to its most central nodes or hubs [31].
Examples of heterogeneous systems include the Internet,
the World Wide Web, and in general most (large-scale)
social systems [26]. In this sense, degree distributions
that follow a power-law (pi ∝ k
−γ
i , where pi is the prob-
ability a node attaches to i, which has already a degree
ki) are usually known as scale-free and reveal a generative
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FIG. 2. The radar chart displays the following network pa-
rameters for the federal crimes data (gray pattern)and its
randomized counterpart (red pattern): diameter (D = 49
and 15), average shortest path length (λ = 14.43 and 6.78),
assortativity (Λ = 0.017 and 0.001), clustering coefficient
(CC = 0.391 and 0.001) and modularity (Q = 0.96 and 0.52).
model with preferential attachment in which nodes tend
to connect to the more popular nodes in a rich-gets-richer
mechanism. However, in real systems the degree might
not be the only factor which attracts connections, in so-
cial networks for instance several qualities might interest
reciprocal relationships such the sharing of same politi-
cal or ethical vision. Such attributes are therefore called
the vertex’s fitness and might generally be expressed by
hybrid multiplicative processes such as the Log-normal
Fitness Attachment (LNFA) [32]
pi(k) ∝ ki
∏
l
φil (1)
where φ represents the set of attributes of node i. When
the number of attributes are sufficiently large and sta-
tistically independent, it is shown that the fitness is log-
normally distributed, regardless of the type of the partic-
ular distribution of each attribute [33, 34]. In the same
way, the degree distribution of the federal crime network
has an approximate log-normal behavior, with a power-
law regime in the middle of the cumulative representa-
tion showing an exponent γ ≃ 2.34 (see Fig. 3), which is
very similar to the Mafia network studied by Agreste et
al. [19] which shows a power-law regime with γ ≃ 2.5 This
means that in this criminal system there is an interplay
between at least two distinct phenomena: the tendency
of individuals to connect not only to hubs, but also to
fittest criminals. This particular multiplicative statistic
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FIG. 3. Cumulative degree distribution for the federal crimes
network with log-log axis and a power law fit in the middle
region (6 < k < 53): P (k) ∼ k−γ with γ ≃ 2.34.
can be explained by group affinities such as gangs, mafia
and mobs which also explains the modular architecture of
the network as it is shown later in the text— Brazil has a
long history of well defined and competing criminal syn-
dicates such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (First
Command of the Capital or PCC) and the Comando Ver-
melho (Red Command or CV) among others, summing
up more than 10,000 individuals nationwide [35]. That
is, among individuals with similar number of connections
(degree), new criminals will connect most likely to the
ones belonging to the criminal gang with stronger influ-
ence in their social medium (higher fitness). Conversely,
if the fitnesses are similar, the vertex with highest degree
will more probably be selected.
NETWORK DISRUPTION &
CONTROLLABILITY
From a network science point of view, a graph can be
refrained from functioning as a whole either by removing
its nodes or by removing only its edges (maintaining the
nodes). In this sense, law enforcement operations usually
aim at identifying and arresting criminals. Therefore, the
arrest of individuals is directly related to the removal
of edges, since the nodes are not in fact deleted from
the network. On the other hand, the deletion of nodes
means the complete removal of that individual from the
criminal network– a scenario that would only occur ei-
ther by death or by re-socialization and not directly by
law enforcement actions. In a topological perspective,
node removal is more effective in atomizing complex net-
works causing more damage per elimination than edge
removal since the deletion of a single node from the net-
work results in the elimination of all links attached to it
[36, 37]. This is a second important result, with impor-
tant sociological implications, ie from a network science
perspective, re-socialization (eg by education or by work)
is in general a more effective strategy to lower crime levels
than imprisonment. Still, it should be noted that accord-
ing to this rationale, even though reprehensible ethically
and legally, the death of the key individuals would reach
similar results, ceteris paribus.
We now simulate both edge and node disruptions to
the network’s giant component by considering two dif-
ferent procedures: high centrality attacks, when a frac-
tion of nodes or edges is deleted simultaneously according
to a list previously ordered by a chosen centrality index
(which is not unique and measures the structural impor-
tance of nodes and edges in keeping the network cohe-
sive) and high centrality adaptive attacks when we at-
tack individual components of the network in accordance
with a list iteratively ordered by a centrality index and
updated after each removal [31]. To test the network’s
structural fragility we disrupt the network by node-based
High Degree Adaptive (HDA), High Betweenness Adap-
tive (HBA), High Degree (HD), High Betweenness (HB)
and Module-Based (MBA) attacks and edge-based High
Betweenness Adaptive (HBA), High Betweenness (HB),
Module-Based attacks (MBA) and Collective Influence
(CI) (see Fig. 4). The degree centrality is just the number
of connections a node has and the betweenness centrality
basically measures the fraction of shortest paths passing
through a given vertex [36]. The collective influence of a
node takes into account the degree of its neighbors at a
given distance l from it in the following way
CIk(i) = (ki − 1)
∑
j∈∂Ball(i,l)
(kj − 1) (2)
where ki is the node’s degree and the ∂Ball(i, l) is the
set of all nodes at a distance l from node i. This method
was proven to be very close to the minimum disman-
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FIG. 4. The figures show the fragmentation curves of the federal crimes network by the relative size of the largest connected
component G as a function of the fraction of nodes or edges removed q, according to different procedures: (A), node-based
High Degree Adaptive (HDA - blue dot dashed line), High Betweenness Adaptive (HBA - black dashed line), Module-Based
attacks (MBA - red solid line), and Collective Influence (CI - magenta two dashed line); (B), node-based High Betweenness
(HB - light blue dotted line), High Degree (HD - golden long dashed line), and Module-Based (MBA - red solid line) attacks;
(C), edge-based High Betweenness Adaptive (HBA - black dashed line), High Betweenness (HB - light blue dotted line), and
Module-Based attacks (MBA - red solid line).
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FIG. 5. The histograms show the performance of the three
best attacks on the federal crimes network. Panel (A) shows
Module-Based (MBA - horizontal red shades), High Between-
ness (HB - inclined blue shades) and High Degree (HD - ver-
tical golden shades) strategies for node removal, while panel
(B) depicts MBA, HB and High Betweenness Adaptive (HBA
- inclined black shades) attacks for edge-based attacks.
tle set [21]. The Module-Based attack [20] is related
to the modular nature of real networks, i.e. the fea-
ture that complex networks tend to group into clusters
densely connected internally but only weakly connected
among them, those clusters are also called modules or
communities. The density of links connecting different
communities when compared to the internal density of
edges is usually measured by the network’s modularity,
Q which ranges from −1 to 1, and depends slightly on
the community extraction algorithm used [38]. It was
previously shown that highly modular networks are frag-
ile to MBA [20]. In this sense, one would expect orga-
nized crime to show highly modular features since the
weak connection among communities would favor the
network’s obscurity while the high internal density of
communities would make a proper scenario to efficiently
run business internally. Indeed, the network has a very
high modularity either using Louvain [39] (Q = 0.96) or
using Infomap [40] (Q = 0.88) methods.
To quantify the effects of each disruption strategy on
the network we measure the size of the largest connected
component relative to the network’s original size, G(q),
as a function of the fraction of removed objects, q. As
pointed out in [41] the generalized robustness of a net-
work to a given attack strategy is given by the metric:
R =
1
N(1−Gmin)
qmax∑
q=0
G(q) (3)
where N is the number of nodes in the network, qmax is
the point at which the attack ends and Gmin is the value
of the relative size of the largest connected component at
qmax. Nonetheless, in order to evaluate the effectiveness
of each strategy, it is also important to measure the trade-
off between robustness (R) and the time (t) needed to
compute the attack list. In this sense, the performance
of an attack is measured by the relation P = t−1 ×R−1
where t is the time taken to complete the procedure in
seconds and R is the robustness [41].
In accordance with these considerations, the attack
strategy with highest performance (see Fig. 5) is MBA
both for node and edge attacks, as expected for the net-
work’s high modularity. However, the network is a little
less robust to HBA, which in turn takes much more time
to compute. In other words, the network would be fully
atomized after removing approximately 2% of its vertices
and almost 5% of its edges by HBA. Besides, the deacti-
vation point at which all communities are detached from
the core of the original graph is reached by the MBA
prescription when nearly 2% of its edges or nodes are
removed. These results mean that even though node at-
tacks are in general more efficient than edge attacks, par-
ticularly in this network both strategies are very similar–
for instance the edge MBA has higher performance and
similar robustness than the node HBA. This is another
important result, since the network would fragment com-
pletely by traditional law enforcement actions (random
attacks) after the random failure of 80% of nodes and
86% of edges. Another important feature is that the sys-
tem is much weaker to HBA and MBA attacks than to
the novel CI strategy as depicted in Fig. 4
7The assortativity (A) is another important aspect of
the network. In assortative networks (A > 0) nodes tend
to connect to others with similar degree and in dissor-
tative networks (A < 0) high degree vertices tend to at-
tach to low degree nodes. For the federal crimes system,
A = 0.02. This is a well know phenomenon in social
networks [42, 43], ie highly prosperous people prefer to
relate to people in the same social layer, in business rela-
tionships entrepreneurs prefer to collaborate with other
big names in search for success, reputation, influence and
social status. Apparently, the same goes with criminal
networks which loosely is just a particular case of a busi-
ness network.
A dynamic system is said to be controllable if one can
get it to evolve from any initial state to an arbitrary final
state in a finite time by an appropriate choice of external
inputs. However, for very large systems such as real net-
works it is more suitable to search for a minimum subset
of nodes whose control guarantees mathematically con-
trol of the whole system. For instance, a dynamic vari-
able such as opinion, wealth or general tendency to com-
mit a crime evolving in time constricted to the criminal
network’s topology is reducible to a minimum or zeroth
level at least in principle if the system is controllable.
Recently, Liu et al [44] developed the so-called structural
controllability theory of directed networks, which consists
into identifying a minimum set of individual driver nodes
to achieve full control of complex networks, which was
shown to be equivalent to problem of maximum match-
ing. More recently, it was shown that structural control-
lability can be achieved with a single time-varying input
suggesting that nodal dynamics is the key factor in de-
termining network controllability [45]. Nonetheless, the
proposal is restricted to directed networks, which is not
the case studied here. Therefore, the exact controllability
theory by Yuan et al [46] is more suited to this criminal
system. This framework is based on using the maximum
geometric multiplicity of the adjacency matrix to find the
minimum set of drivers required to fully control the sys-
tem. In this sense, consider a linear system described by
the following set of ordinary differential equations:
x˙ = Ax+Bu, (4)
where the vector x stands for the states of the nodes, A
is the adjacency matrix of the network whose elements
are aij = 1 if nodes i and j are connected and aij = 0
otherwise, u is the vector of controllers and B is the
control matrix. This system is said to be controllable
according to the framework proposed by Yuan et al [46]
if we control a minimum fraction of nodes (called drivers
or controllers) given by:
nD =
1
N
max{1, N − rank(A)}, (5)
In their seminal article Liu et al have shown that,
counter-intuitively, social networks usually have very low
nD values if compared to biological or infrastructure net-
works. Confirming those results, the criminal network
studied here has a fraction of drivers nD = 0.21, suggest-
ing that the whole criminal system could be, in principle,
controlled by only 2, 076 individuals.
GENERAL DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Thanks to a recent network data acquisition program
by the Brazilian Federal Police, we where able to study
the network structure, robustness and control of a large
and unique criminal network covering different classes
of federal crimes all over Brazil. The system was built
directly by Federal Agents assigned to each investigation
and consists of 23,666 individuals in 35,913 undirected
and unweighted relationships. Surprisingly, the network
has a giant component holding more than 40% of the
nodes and 54% of the edges. We have showed that the
network shows small-world and scale-free behaviors being
“darker” than traditional social networks, i.e. combining
both low edge density values and low network efficiency.
The network is particularly weak to high betweenness
adaptive attacks and module-based attacks due mostly
to its high modular nature. The MBA attacks show
a higher performance, meaning the deactivation point
where all communities are disjointed is reached at the
expend of less computational effort than the fully atom-
ized phase reached by centrality-based attacks with both
critical points being not far from each other.
Counter-intuitively, the network is highly controllable
in the sense that it is possible, in principle, to take any
dynamical variable (like opinion, wealth or criminal ten-
dency) from its initial state to arbitrary final states by
controlling approximately only 20% of its nodes, in what
appears to be a typical behavior of social networks. How-
ever, even though the mathematical controllability of this
criminal system is guaranteed by the control of less than
a quarter of its nodes, it is not clear what this means in
practical terms for social systems. For instance, one is
usually interested in finding a desired stable final state
or else the system will easily move away, therefore math-
ematical controllability per se does not provide fully use-
ful results. Besides, in social networks the drivers are
people and even the task of engineering a single input
becomes unclear and arguable both ethically and juridi-
cally. Thence a deep understanding of social control is
still a very open subject.
We argue that traditional imprisonment is equivalent
to edge-based attacks, while node-based attacks are more
related to the death or complete re-socialization of crim-
inals. However, although in general it is more efficient
to remove nodes than edges, particularly in this network
both strategies have similar results. Besides that, the
criminal data-bank is continuously growing (at the mo-
ment we submitted this paper the size of the dataset
8reached more than 100,000 nodes) making it virtually
impossible to generate iteratively N betweenness-based
attack lists, which grows at best as (N × E)2. There-
fore, the best strategy to reduce criminality levels in ac-
cordance with the topology of federal crimes in Brazil
would be either by educational or by prison polices with
the targets chosen by a modular approach depending on
the political and practical feasibility of each strategy–
for instance the prison system would have to really work
in cutting prisoners’ social ties and in re-socializing or
educating them, which are de facto very hard tasks.
Our future research will focus experimentally on crim-
inal networks dynamics and effective control. We hope
our results will help change the approach of law enforce-
ment agencies worldwide and thence lowering crime level
specially in Brazil. The authors would like to thank
the Institutional Defense Unit and the Organized Crime
Fighting Unit of the Brazilian Federal Police at Rio
Grande do Sul.
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